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RUEHXX/GENEVA IO MISSIONS COLLECTIVE  
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RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON PRIORITY 0677  
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0515  
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 0541  
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON PRIORITY 0615  
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PRIORITY 0409  
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DILI 000487

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/MTS, IO  
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NSC FOR HOLLY MORROW  
PACOM FOR JOC AND POLAD  
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/3/2016

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SUBJECT: PREVIEW OF UN COMMISSION OF INQUIRY REPORT ON TIMOR CRISIS

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CLASSIFIED BY: Gary Gray, Charge d'Affaires, U.S. Embassy Dili,  
Department of State.

REASON: 1.4 (b)

¶1. (C) Summary. According to one of its principal authors, the UN Special Commission of Inquiry report pulls no punches in naming the direct perpetrators and assessing responsibilities for the April-May crisis. The report recommends prosecution of former Interior Minister Rogerio Lobato and elements of the F-FDTL leadership (including General Taur Matan Ruak, Colonel Lere Anan and Major Maubuti) for illegal actions, as well as for more direct perpetrators of the violence, including Oan Kiak, Captain Alfredo Reinado, Abilio Mesquita, and Railos. It does not recommend prosecution of former Prime Minister Alkatiri, however, only recommending 'further investigation', and alludes to the 'irresponsible' March 23 speech of President Gusmao. The report finds no evidence of rumored mass killings by F-FDTL on April 28-29, and also dismisses conspiracy theories that Fretilin had a coordinated plan to destroy the political opposition. There is serious concern regarding the potential for violent reactions once the report becomes public. Prime Minister Ramos Horta would like the release to be delayed from the scheduled October 7 date until upcoming rotations of the Portuguese and Malaysian rapid reaction forces are completed and it now looks likely that the need to translate the document into Tetun will push the release off until late in the month. End summary.

¶2. (C) CDA met on October 1 with a UN official who is one of the primary authors of the UN Special Commission of Inquiry report on the April-May events. He said the completed draft had been sent to Geneva for clearance, but did not anticipate that Geneva would make any major changes or "water down" the findings in any way. He was adamant that the report pulled no punches in describing in some detail the various clashes and, to the maximum extent permitted by the evidence, "named the names" of those directly involved. The major actors in this regard

include dissident commander of the F-FDTL Military Police Major Alfredo Reinado, Abilio Mesquita of the National Police (PNTL), former Falintil fighter Oan Kiak, and Rai Los, the leader of the Liquica-based group allegedly armed by former Minister of Interior Lobato. Thereport recommends that all be prosecuted. The report also fingers the F-FDTL leadership, including Brigadier General Taur Matan Ruak, Colonel Lere, and Major Maubuti, for illegal acts and recommends prosecutions. As expected, illegal acts of former Interior Minister Rogerio Lobato feature prominently in the report, which recommends that he be prosecuted.

13. (C) According to this source, the Commission encountered many claims that then Prime Minister Alkatiri may have been aware of if not behind certain illegal acts, but it seemed that Alkatiri had been quite adept at insuring that he was one step removed. There was nevertheless enough evidence for the report to recommend "further investigation" of the ex-Prime Minister. The report also censures President Gusmao for his "irresponsible" speech of March 23. The report attempts to put to rest widely circulating reports that F-FDTL carried out mass killings of dozens of people on April 28-29, concluding that there is no evidence to support this. The report also dismisses conspiracy theories regarding purported coordinated plans by Fretilin to destroy the political opposition.

14. (C) The UN official indicated that the report allocates much of the blame to Timorese institutions as a whole. The UN mission also does not come off unscathed, with one mention of "faulty management" by former SRSB Hasegawa during the height of the crisis.

15. (C) There is serious concern among UN and senior GOET officials regarding potentially violent reactions once the report becomes public. In a September 27 meeting with us Prime Minister Ramos Horta predicted that if the report exonerates Alkatiri while recommending prosecution of Lobato, "a strong negative reaction," including demonstrations and waves of arson, could be expected. Embassy sources have also reported that significant numbers of people from the eastern districts are leaving Dili for their home districts in anticipation of a

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violent response by western opposition groups. In light of the scheduled October 7 release date for the report, the Prime Minister expressed concern that both the Portuguese GNR and the Malaysian rapid reaction force are slated for rotation around October 6, with the replacement personnel not arriving for several more days. He therefore urged that the report's release be delayed by two weeks or so. Acting SRSB Finn Reske-Neilson indicated to us that such a delay is likely, due both to the concern regarding the security forces and the need to translate the report into Tetun.

16. (C) Comment. It is encouraging that, unlike previous UN investigations here, the Commission's report will apparently pull no punches (with the possible exception of the ex-Prime Minister's role). A slight delay in the release to ensure that adequate security forces are on hand seems justified, but it is essential that the report be made public soon to move the process along. We are not yet convinced that the GOET, UNMIT, and the JTF are fully prepared for the possible consequences of the report's release, and will be strongly encouraging them to be ready for all contingencies. RSO and visiting DS analyst discussed these issues in meetings with local counterparts last week, who did not yet seem to have a good handle on where violent reactions may break out. The Embassy will also be closely assessing the situation in regard to our own security concerns. End comment.  
GRAY